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1. Introduction
The parallel evolution of automotive industry and anywhere/anytime communication
mechanisms has defined a revolutionary moment for intelligent driving concept. Vehicular
Ad Hoc Networks, also known as VANETs, exploit the capability of wireless communications
protocols to confidently disseminate sensitive information among peers, restricted to a
particular geographic area, as well as the advanced safety-assets, on road sensors and
sophisticated driving-assistance features of top-generation vehicles. Such a complement
are not only oriented to offer a more pleasant in-car experience for driver and passengers,
but also are intended to introduce autonomous and efficient ways to prevent hazardous
situations on roads. Then, VANETs deployment should follow a primary task based
on reliable message handling for sharing traffic conditions, weather variables, driving
assistance, navigation support, entertainment content multicasting and even spurious
notifications [1], [2].
Regarding some previous approaches over vehicular networks, Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)
and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) are two well-know concepts for their implementation [3], [4].
The former claims for a centralized control entity dedicated to information processing and
decision making. Although, given the dynamic nature of the involved communications
nodes, the ubiquity along the road becomes a mandatory requirement. This might implies
a high-affordable effort, due to the demanded deployment of extended communication
infrastructure road-sided [5].
On the other hand, the introduction of inter-vehicle communication takes advantage of
partially decentralized and self-controlled characteristics from mobile nodes. Such a
distributed scenario forms an interim delegation of controlling role, while the privilege to
command the network is granted based on the possession of sensitive information to be
shared among peers. Correspondingly, V2V communication inherits typical performance
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hurdles and security threats from distributed mobile networks [6], [7]. Consequently,
particular attention should be given to node authenticity, message integrity and reputation
features, aiming to promote an integral trust solution [8]. Since an important set of messages
contains critical information for the vehicles involved, selfish or malicious behavior should
be diminished as possible. On this way, strategies conducted in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
(MANETs) research context are prone to be addressed in VANETs setups as well [9], in order
to contrast results from real and simulated scenarios regarding native vehicular network
protocols and ad hoc networks’ tailored approaches.
The present chapter is dedicated to the review of trust and reputation models for
VANETs from different technical, technological and performance perspectives. Besides,
novel approaches are introduced, given their capabilities to tackle some of drawbacks and
downsides of current approaches [10].
The achievement of trustworthiness among peers infers some inherent challenges owing
to vehicles’ high speeds and ephemeral associations. For this reason, an initial key issue
is directed to guarantee the verification and processing of incoming information in a
real-time basis. Likewise, the large population of automobiles in urban streets or suburbs
highways at specific time periods affects network channel saturation. Then, some efforts
should be oriented to turn the implicit protocols into scalable mechanisms and selective
message forwarding. Moreover, VANETs’ dynamic properties lead to assume the necessity
of decentralized and self-controlled infrastructures appealing to unique and short-term
acquaintances among peers. However, hybrid or combined models are subject of discussion
in the upcoming sections as feasible VANETs environments. Additionally, VANETs incidents
can be distinguished as informational, warning and critical events; in any case spatiotemporal
descriptors (i.e. location and time tags) must be properly processed according to priority, life
span and certainty aspects. Finally, the adoption of mobility models is directly related with
the efficiency of the trust and the reputation system, whereas the accuracy degree of transit
patterns influences simulations’ results and further implementations in real scenarios [11].
The upcoming sections discuss some remarks on trust and reputation management systems,
as well as, trustworthiness models based on diverse mechanisms for scalability, privacy, entity
management, content reputation, forwarding, rewarding and so on. Afterwards, innovative
models are described in order to establish their original contributions for challenges
overthrowing and general VANETs development.
2. Trust and reputation for VANETs in scope
Pursuing multi-featured trust and reputation models, issues of scalability, security,
performance and sustainability should be addressed in VANETs. Inasmuch as multi-featured
trust and reputation models are pursued, topics from generalization, security, performance
and sustainability are addressed. The following criteria enclose the requirements and
guidelines in order to accomplish outstanding trust and reputation models [12], [13].
2.1. Low complexity
The interactions among VANETs’ peers are characterized by a circumstantial occurrence
at high speeds and short time periods (ephemeral acquaintances). During this timeframe,
the sender automobile should transfer reliable information within its influence radius. The
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computation of trust and reputation metrics should be executed by the master algorithm
under low complexity constraints, i.e. cost-efficient processing, fast-access memory,
improved transmission rates and effective throughput.
Hardware and software specifications related to processing and storage are conceived not
only to fulfill single-threaded duty cycles at high frequencies, but also to support eventual
burst of messages from different sources at given time instants. Similarly, data transmission
rates need to rely on recognized standards and specifications in charge of modulation
schemes, media access and packet routing. Even so, the overhead linked to the throughput
portion should be kept at minimum, since excessive encode/decode of protocols headers
leads to critical delays for the reception of meaningful driving information.
2.2. Scalability
Scalability should be understood as a fundamental condition for a trust and reputation
mechanism in any application. Moreover, the occurrence of incidents or events on the road
could be triggered by multiple mobile nodes, as well as single or minor set of vehicles. Either
way, the system should be prepared to conveniently process any incoming information at
bursting rates, preventing increased packet drop or perceptible latency at decision time.
An initial approach implies the improvement of system’s physical capabilities to handle
plenty of concurrent messages, and thus, reducing the probability of missing messages or
extended processing cycles for warnings and alerts posting. In general, the fulfillment of
requirements by the overestimation of resources seems to be the most immediate, but rarely,
the most efficient solution. Therefore, alternative methods should be employed to chase
model’s top-performance, while low complexity and simplicity are preserved. For instance,
solutions based on reputation records could allow selective forwarding and reception of
incoming and outcoming information, respectively. So that resources are allocated to nodes
that have displayed a good behavior within the network. Of course, prerequisites must
be taken into account to promote the success of this model; such as precedent behavior
awareness and reputation history access. Balance-oriented solutions claim for fair resources
disposal, accompanied by the definition of conservative thresholds around incoming packets
upper limits, relay nodes allowance and messages intervals designation.
2.3. Sparsity
Some VANETs’ environments can be described as dense populations of vehicles confined
to relatively tight geographic areas, e.g. peak hours in urban zones. Other environments,
like interstate or international highways are characterized by extensive trails with minimal
density of automobiles. This situation makes difficult the application of multihop routing
protocols from sources of events to spots of interest. Consequently, trust and reputation
models should not be based on the evaluation of peer interactions, such as lists of relay
nodes and reputation scorecards. Instead of this, these models should take into account
the scarcity of information in the VANET. So, decision making algorithms and thresholds
settings need to be as flexible as possible to process these messages. Even more, they should
provide valuable data to the onboard driver and eventual adjacent mobile nodes, instead of
attempting an unbiased execution of the trust and reputation mechanism.
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2.4. Security and privacy-related
Undoubtedly, the extension of a security middleware for VANETs is understood as a major
concern, relaying either on centralized or distributed schemes. Generally, every different
approach aims to shield the communication infrastructure against potential security threats
and vulnerabilities [14]. For example, one usual threat is represented by malicious mobile
nodes, which might attempt to disseminate false or corrupted information by making use
of resources and the communication channel, perversely. Dissimilarly to other network
contexts, misbehavior of a single node might imply severe or even lethal consequences to
benign peers; whereas the injection of deceiving content is prone to conclude in inattention
of vital recommendations or commitment of undesired actions. The author Zhang in [13]
describes some common attacks that represent a critical challenge for trust and reputation
mechanisms. Some of them are briefly introduced as follows.
• Newcomer Attack: Specially applied by mobile nodes with an undesirable cooperative
behavior. By the registration of a new identity in the trust and reputation system, the
malicious node attempts to delete its negative history to gain the attention of adjacent
nodes as a freshman.
• Sybil Attack: Consists of creating multiple and fake identities (pseudonyms) by a single
malicious entity. Thereafter, a pass-through is granted to the false information by
pretending peers, who attempt to detour network resources to their own benefit or
collapse general message distribution.
• Betrayal Attack: Appealing to a hypocrite strategy, a malicious peer formidably
cooperates within the network until high reputation and trust scores are received.
Suddenly, its behavior turns inadequate by propagating deceiving content, while it takes
advantage of the influence over the mobile neighbors.
• Inconsistency Attack: Related to the previous attack, a vehicle oscillates between benign
and malicious behavior at different periods of time. The intention of this attack seeks
to destabilize the trust and reputation mechanism by entering chaotic records to the
observed interaction among mobile nodes.
• Collusion Attack: Also known as conspiracy attack, a group of malicious peers subscribes
a dishonest coalition to generate false information to the network from multiple points.
Keeping relatively outnumbered agents, the attack may also affect or even collapse the
content distribution system among vehicles.
• Bad-mouthing/Ballot Stuffing Attack: Following the line of conspiracy attacks, a set of
malicious nodes gains access to the network with a cooperative behavior. Once, rating
or feedbacks about other adjacent peers are requested, inaccurate opinions are provided.
Attempting to unfairly increase reputation of suspicious nodes (ballot stuffing) or unfairly
decrease reputation of benign entities (bad-mouthing).
Defense mechanisms for the aforementioned attacks are regarded from the universal
framework of information security for general data networks [15], including AAA protocols,
symmetric, asymmetric systems, cryptographic key management, etc. However, absolute
solutions have not still been met; e.g. the absence of key distribution mechanisms may lead
to the interception of shared secrets by unauthorized entities in symmetric key deployments.
On the other hand, the asymmetric cryptosystems may compromise the public keys’
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distribution by sophisticated techniques of replacement or theft of network identities and
traffic information. Therefore, keys authenticity assurance turns into a vital security matter.
So, the deployment of credentials, from now on called certificates, allow us to bind the public
key to the owner’s name and a trusted third party, designated as Certificate Authority (CA).
Of course, the generation, management and revocation of certificates may become a complex
endeavor when the number of network entities tends to increase. For this reason, a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) rises as a solution to handle major aspects, such as certificates’ lifecycles,
issuance, distribution, suspension and revocation. Although, further considerations should
be applied to adapt PKI to a partial or total distributed topology in VANETs environment.
2.5. Independence of mobility patterns
Mobility pattern is a central point of the discussion about VANETs topologies. Even more,
mobility pattern is a crucial issue in ad hoc networks research, given its direct relation
with protocols, models and performance analysis. The definition of restrains for the transit,
environment variables and interaction rules among entity nodes, determines a set of standard
rules for a correct simulation and performance analysis of VANETs. In VANETs context, a
group of mobility patterns has been proposed intending to assemble an universal playbook
to guide the simulation of different vehicular models, including trust and reputation. Those
patterns aim to set parameters related to automobiles density, traffic area, traffic lights
and stop signs existance, average speeds, block and streets disposition, weather conditions,
overtaking chances and any other variable that can emulate a real vehicular scenario [11].
Despite of being so attractive, the idea behind of a trust and reputation model entirely
independent of mobility patterns, there are reasonable and heuristic assumptions that might
lead to disregard this possibility. Instead of designing a unique trust and reputation model
for any possible mobility pattern, major efforts should be conducted to adapt variations of
the mechanism to consider some of the most recurrent patterns in urban or rural areas.
Consequently, models’ structure should include degrees of freedom that easily permit
alternative resources allocation and algorithmic shortcomings, depending on detected transit,
environmental and interaction parameters.
2.6. Trust and reputation decentralization
The distributed and self-controlled feature of VANETs is an extensively accepted concept,
given the mobile-oriented dynamic of the nodes. Thus, lots of research works refer to
message relay, security assurance, privacy adoption and trust/reputation establishment
toward decentralized deployments. The interaction among peers is the base of trust and
reputation construction [16]. Random peer-to-peer acquaintances allow the establishment
of trustworthiness relationships by references at first hand, i.e. the definition of reliable
nodes depends on direct observations by the sensor-equipped vehicle on road. It is expected
to assign a greater confidence valuation to those nodes, once the event or incident is
corroborated by an observer peer. Complementary, referral mechanisms are introduced to
trust and reputation systems in order to optimize the convergence time and awareness status.
That means, an interested node might request recommendations or opinions from adjacent
nodes to assign a trust value to peers out of the scope. Also, it is expected to set a lower
confidence degree to unreachable vehicles, ought to the lack of personal certainty about
its reliability. Achieving a complete decentralization is not easy due to slow convergence,
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delays in peer status update, network changes, etc. Indeed, the uncertainty about short-term
or long-term encounters among vehicles hinders the assembling of trust information over the
whole network. Because of this, there are proposals to introduce some controversial entities
in VANETs, the Road Side Units (RSU). They would coordinate the gathering of information
at infrastructure based concentration points, in a centralized approach. Due to a hard-wired
interconnection (e.g. optic fiber rings), RSUs are capable to share information at significant
transfer rates to be transmitted immediately to vehicles within their coverage. In spite of
breaking apart the decentralization concept, coexistence of both mechanisms for trust and
reputation establishment are still widely studied [17], [18].
2.7. Confidence measure
Even though, trust and reputation mechanisms have been able to carry on trustworthiness
valuations successfully. Some additional metrics need to be applied, in order to introduce
“Quality Assurance“ (QA) into VANETs’ models. The knowledge level about mobile peers
may not be always associated to highly consistence databases, due to several facts. For
example, minimum requirements for algorithm computation, lack of memory, unavailability
of data or simply owners’ and manufacturers’ discretion.
For this reason, confidence measure stands out as a statistical QA parameter to assess the
accuracy degree of modeled trustworthiness values [13]. A scoped vehicle makes use of
this measure to decide how useful the incoming content could be, according to particular
circumstances on the road. Such that, an automobile with low confidence measures about
neighbors and events is encouraged to seek alternative referees to improve its levels of
certainty; but the same vehicle who faces scarcity of information sources has no better option
than supports its decision on the current confidence metric. Then, exactly the same parameter
can be easily ignored at one particular situation and overvalued throughout in another.
2.8. Event description and spatiotemporal specification
There are various types of events to happen on roads, highways or even quiet urban lanes.
The description level plays a fundamental role within trust and reputation models to assign
weights and priority tags to incoming information, according to messages’ description. The
distinction among informational, warning and critical events needs to be clearly specified
and managed by all peers. Not only to suggest a suitable action in consequence with the
input data, but also to incentivize with proportional rewards to the forwarding nodes. It
means, nodes that are willing to cooperate wisely with life-saving messages over meaningless
broadcasting.
Likewise, location and time parameters exhibit further benefits in trustworthiness assessment
than merely timestamps accounting features. High-dynamic essence of VANETs infers
real-time spatiotemporal feedback about vehicles walk-through, expecting minor location
and launching efforts of authorities, when incidents occur. Once a major event is reported,
mobile nodes that are closer located and sooner reckoning might offer a greater accuracy
of transmitted information, as well as, the kind of assistance required. In this case,
advantageous geolocation of reporter nodes should be also treated with higher trust values
and subsequently generous reputation scores should be awarded, if information is confirmed.
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Summarizing, Table 1 depicts the criteria for trust and reputation models in VANETs with
their corresponding current development status, according to the related research work.
Feature Pending In progress Covered
Low Complexity ×
Scalability ×
Sparsity ×
Security and privacy-related ×
Mobility patterns independent ×
Trust and reputation decentralization ×
Confidence measure ×
Event and spatiotemporal specification ×
Table 1. Criteria for trust and reputation models in VANETs.
3. Discussion on trust and reputation models
At this point, a rich collection of challenges about trust and reputation modeling for
VANETs has been introduced. Now, a review of existing mechanisms is prepared, attending
to challenges, design criteria, implementation hurdles and support insights. Depending
on particular VANET context, several models are explored, appealing to heterogeneous
techniques over infrastructure, interaction and trustworthiness assessment matters. In what
follows, we will review some of them.
3.1. Content Reputation System - CoRS
CoRS protocol is a content-based message reputation model, i.e. message content is the
primary analysis object for trustworthiness computation [17]. Nevertheless, additional
features are applied for node authenticity and information integrity based on cryptographic
mechanisms. PKI infrastructure and threshold cryptography are the components employed
by CoRS to assess reliability of mobile nodes, while the protocol focuses on content
reputation, exclusively. The former demands a valid pair of cryptographic keys for each
participant in the VANET, which are usually provided by the CA. The distribution of digital
certificates includes a public and a private key, which are meant to establish a secure channel
among peers for the exchange of messages. As long as ciphersuites are in charge of encoding
and decoding tasks at each side. In the same manner, digital certificates are engaged to
perform authentication procedures in order to validate peers’ identity, as a first step.
On the other hand, the threshold cryptography system performs a critical role within the
content reputation model. Despite of being an old-fashioned concept in information security
literature, its validity remains quite bearable. The basic concept behind cryptographic
threshold states a mechanism to divide into n chunks a whole data packet P, and
then, a previous knowledge of c or more chunks will permit the complete packet P
reconstruction [19]. But only, defining up to c − 1 chunks will lead to a certain data
undisclosed; so polynomial interpolation is applied to compute the initial threshold pair
(c, n). From that, the theorem claims that given c different points on the two-dimensional
plane, such that (xi, yi) ∀ i ∈ [1, c], one and only one polynomial f (x)| f (xi) = yi with
degree c− 1 exists. The remaining chunks of the data packet P can be found with Equation 1
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f (x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + a3x
3 + · · ·+ an−1x
c−1 (1)
where a0 represents the whole data packet P and the other coefficients ai are chosen
randomly. To summarize, the definition of c chunks and their corresponding indices
conducts to find the coefficients of f (x) and recover data packet P = f (0) by interpolation
computation.
The threshold cryptography is applied in threshold signatures generation, which is the
core machinery of trustworthiness assembly in CoRS. This cryptosystem introduces digital
signatures for distributed environments by the usage of three major components: 1) a
threshold public key Kpub, 2) a certificate C and 3) a key share Kshare, which is a partial
private key. Such that, only the combination of cooperative nodes with their respective
Kshare allows digital signature verification, and thus, content validation. The management of
Kshare is delegated on a CA or share dealer; which should cope with the determination of
the minimum number of Kshare required to successfully sign a message, as well as, at least
one share delivery to each mobile node. Figure 1 shows players and workflow of threshold
signature for distributed reputation systems.
Once, the share dealer has generated and distributed Kshare among registered vehicles, a
random combiner executes an algorithm to integrate partially signed data chunks; whose
outcome produces a valid digital signature to sign the message. So, the resulting signature
can be verified using the corresponding certificate, whilst individual shares are kept in secret
during combination process. Figure 1 depicts the threshold signature procedure for CoRS
protocol.
Having all the pieces into place, we will proceed to explain the involved phases in CoRS
mechanism.
3.1.1. CoRS initialization
The CA or share dealer generates the required certificates (including public cryptographic
key Kpub), and shares Kshare for n mobile nodes. Attempting to avoid a constant reset of
the system every time a new vehicle registers into a particular VANET context, the relation
between the number of nodes and shares is kept Nnodes ≫ Nshares. That implies, more
than one automobile is using the same Kshare to partially sign the message. Gathering those
components, each mobile node is prepared to perform authentication, data protection and
message integrity, before content reputation system is taking place.
3.1.2. CoRS implementation
The protocol starts to detect an event or incident at some mobile node, known as generator
(stage 1). Before it sends an information message msg, some support data is requested from
the nodes located in the reputation area; even though the adjacent nodes very likely detect
the same event, they are denoted as verifiers (stage 2). Then, generator produces a reputation
request, which is signed using its personal private key Kpriv and it is sent to the verifiers
with the message itself. At verifier’s side, the reputation request is validated employing the
cryptographic elements. Further, content is verified, trying to check the several pieces of
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Figure 1. Threshold security for CoRS protocol.
information to evaluate the values for the reputation metrics rm (stage 5). Such metrics serve
to rate candidate events and message settings, depending on the most suitable category
according to the following information.
• Event: In the case that the verifier has detected the same event as the generator, the former
has the right to examine the message msg later. If not, the protocol workflow is terminated
and the reputation request is not signed with its own Kshare.
• Event detection time: The generator sets the message’s timestamp as same as the event
detection time. When the verifier receives a reputation request, its timestamp should not
be larger than a predefined threshold, so only recent events are processed.
• Location of the event: The verifier determines the location of the event included in the
reputation request, in order to define if it is identical to the incident observed by itself in
its coverage area.
• Location of the node: To check the location of the generator in comparison with the
potential verifiers and the event itself, a collator is required to resolve whether the distance
is reasonably close.
• Sending time of the request: Eventually, a collator is not available at the sending time of
the reputation request. Then, a second request will be transmitted with an implicit delay.
The difference between event detection and sending time must handle some tolerance to
allow further protocol computation.
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Once, the reputation rm information have been gathered to rate the trustworthiness level, a
reputation computation is performed as follows.
Rep(msg) = ∑
m∈ℜ
rm (2)
For simplicity matters, unit-value scores are granted, i.e. +1 is given to affirmative
validations, 0 for neutral and -1 for unsuccessful validations. While, Rep(msg) ≥ 0 condition
is fulfilled, the message msg is regarded as valid with a positive reputation and the verifier
is set free to send a reply to the generator. Otherwise, the request reputation is neglected,
turning the mobile node into a denier. The transmission of the reply message follows
the same threshold cryptography guidelines, assuring authenticity and integrity by digital
signing with Kshare (stage 6). Furthermore, the generator collects all the incoming messages in
order to validate digital signatures, and finds the information associated with the generated
reputation request (stage 7). If all parameters of threshold signatures are hold (refer to
section 3.1 introduction) (stage 8), the information message msg is distributed to other peers
outside of the reputation area to let them know about the event or incident that is happening
on the road.
As optional protocol’s add-ons, broadcast manager (stage 3) and DoS protection (stage 4)
help out to prevent broadcast storms and irregular content distribution, respectively. The
former avoids reprocessing of already sent messages and the latter continuously check a list
of banned peers, given its dishonest previous behavior.
The Figure 2 summarizes the stages involves in CoRS protocol workflow, based on player
and general actions.
3.1.3. CoRS remarks
Despite of the reliance of CoRS protocol on central entities, the participation of
central authorities or dealers represents a well-conducted and sustained strategy for
node authentication, message integrity and data confidentiality. However, additional
countermeasures are taken to avoid reiterative CA advisory, like threshold digital signature
in a distributed mode. Though, the performance of different ciphersuites is not particularly
discussed in CoRS framework; the protocol’s workflow permits to infer a low complexity
nature. By observing the protocol’s pseudocode and involved stages, from event
detection until information dissemination. CoRS preserves a balance between demand and
consumption of resources [17].
Besides of this, threshold cryptography allows to improve scalability and sparsity, due to the
bulky generation of shares among peers.
Nevertheless, it is possible for shares to collide during the normal execution of CoRS. Since,
the number of nodes is always far greater than the number of shares, the possibility of
assigning the same share to more than one automobile is quite plausible. Then, statistical
modules may be needed to foresee encounter among peers with the same cryptographic
signing material. Such a situation increases the complexity and time response of the general
protocol. Owing to the distributed threshold cryptography, a compromising attack from
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Figure 2. Content Reputation System (CoRS) workflow and stages [17].
one isolated node seems to be unfeasible. But, perverse coalitions among malicious peers
(al least equivalent to the number of signing shares) will lead to successful collusion and
bad-mouthing/ballot stuffing attacks. Finally, the existence of a role player, known as collator
for location and time judging before ambiguities presence, it is more than necessary for the
proper protocol walkthrough. Apparently, non-contingent policy is introduced to confidently
step over or replace this sensitive requirement, so a high-faulty point is discovered.
3.2. Trust and Reputation Infrastructure-based Proposal - TRIP
TRIP protocol can be labeled as a hybrid trust and reputation model, whereas trustworthiness
assessment is entity node- and content-oriented [20]. The decision making starts with
a reputation score computation referred by three different possible sources: 1) directly
acquainted mobile nodes, 2) referee nodes with indirect contact and 3) centralized authorities,
like CA or RSU. Secondly, each mobile node is classified into three different trust levels,
represented by fuzzy sets [12]. Considering, nodes’ categorization further actions are
committed. For instance, absolute data rejection (Not trust), data acceptance but not
forwarding (+/- Trust) and message acceptance and forwarding (Trust). Finally, the
information message is associated to a particular severity, priority or hazard. Only peers
located in the highest trust level are allowed to transmit messages with the most critical
severity. Similarly, peers settled in unfavorable trust levels will not find successful acceptance
of any kind of message.
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Figure 3. TRIP protocol workflow and stages.
3.2.1. Trust score computation
Let define vi as the vehicle in charge of assessing a trust score for another vehicle vj, which
sends the message with a current situation on the road. As it was mentioned before, three
different sources are empowered by TRIP protocol to issue a reputation score. Equations 3-5
denote the notation given to the calculation emitted by a direct peer, a referee node and a
centralized entity, respectively.
αi ∗ Repij(t− 1) ∀ Repij ∈ [0, 1] αi ∈ [0, 1] (3)
βi
N
∑
k=1
ωk ∗ Reckj ∀ Reckj ∈ [0, 1] βi,ωk ∈ [0, 1] (4)
γi ∗ RecRSUj ∀ RecRSUj ∈ [0, 1] γi ∈ [0, 1] (5)
From Equation 3, a mobile node i has given a reputation score Rep about node j at a previous
time instant (t − 1); and a tunable weight αi is granted. Accordingly in Equation 4, a set of
N peers indexed by k issues a recommendation Rec about node j, where ωk represents the
reliability of such referrals and βi assigns a corresponding weight to the source. Finally,
Equation 5 infers the recommendation value generated by RSU to a node j, accompanied
by its weight γi. All the scores and weights are constrained to be allocated in the interval
[0, 1]. Merging the prior expressions, it is obtained the trustworthiness assessment for TRIP
protocol, as shown in Equation 6.
Repij(t) = αi ∗ Repij(t− 1) + βi
N
∑
k=1
ωk ∗ Reckj + γi ∗ RecRSUj ∀ Repij ∈ [0, 1] (6)
As soon as trust score is calculated, encouragements and punishments are scattered across
the reputation area by the confirmation or denial of the reported event. The weights αi, βi,γi
and reliability index ωk are subject of increments and decrements, based on the accuracy
level in the information disseminated by ith and kth peers at time instants t. Furthermore, the
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identification of customary malicious nodes can be referred to central authorities or RSUs
to compose a black list, which it is employed to ban spurious peers’ participation with no
further computations.
3.2.2. Trust level classification
The analytical value attained by Equation 6 leads to make a decision about the received
information. According to the score, the message may be rejected, accepted but not
forwarded, or accepted and forwarded. The authors in [12] proposed the fuzzy sets rendered
in Figure 4 to associate trust levels and scores.
Figure 4. Fuzzy sets for trust levels [12].
To determine which trust level the automobile belongs to, each fuzzy set owns a membership
function ξF : F → [0, 1] (see Figure 4). Such that, the probability that a mobile node is placed
in trust level TLk is obtained by Equation 7.
P(TLk) =
ξk
ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3
∀ ξk = ξTLk (Repij(t)) (7)
Given that a spotted vehicle is allocated in Not Trust region, its message is immediately
neglected and one entry is entered in the black list managed by RSU. On the contrary, if
the spotted vehicle is awarded in Trust set, its information is processed and shared with the
nodes within the coverage area. The shadowing zone, labeled as +/- Trust supports message
acceptance with no forwarding chance. However, the message acceptance is conditioned to
an adaptable probability, designated as follows.
P+/−T = µ+/−T − µNT − σNT (8)
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where µ+/−T , µNT and σNT are the +/- Trust mean, Not Trust mean and Not Trust standard
deviation, correspondingly. So, the higher µ+/− becomes and the lower µNT , σNT tends, the
higher the probability of acceptance P+/−T will be set.
3.2.3. Message severity designation
At the end, a certain severity level is given to each received message; which can be
distinguished for important and hazard messages, information warnings and advertisement
or less critical content. Therefore, Table 2 sums up the implicit relation between message
classification and trust levels assigned to particular nodes.
Severity/Issued by nodes Trust +/- Trust Not Trust
Hazard messages ×
Information warnings × ×
Advertisement content × ×
Table 2. Acceptance of messages’ severity with respect to trust levels.
3.2.4. TRIP remarks
TRIP protocol makes use of simple but well-assembled instruments in trustworthiness
pursuing, by assessing trust scores with weighted polling strategies. Also, fair rewards and
penalties are imposed to multilateral information sources, whilst the option of gaining higher
rates is present, as long as peers interaction keeps in progress. Moreover, allocation of nodes
and messages to different classification scales is based on tunable probabilistic functions,
which might be adapted according to VANET context and observed nodes’ behavior.
Unfortunately, no effort is intended to ensure the authenticity of the node, peers partial
identification or pseudonyms avoidance. Even so, parallel research works in MANETs are
proposed by the authors to cope with that. Therefore, the back door for newcomer and Sybil
attacks is open, since the protocol by itself does not implement resilient mechanisms against
them. In spite of integrating central entities or RSU as collaborative members for the query
of malicious nodes’ black list, the protocol manages to make of it a dispensable feature.
3.3. Data-Centric Trust Establishment framework - DCTE
For DCTE framework, trustworthiness establishment is sought through content analysis
rather than entity nodes’ identification. In paper [21], the authors claim: ”data trustworthiness
should be attributed primarily to data per se, rather than being merely a reflection of the trust attributed
to data-reporting entities“. The derivation of trust and reputation metrics is focused on the
amount of information that can be extracted from reported events. Likewise, multiple sources
of evidence are taken into account to assign specific weights, in regard of inherent variables,
such as geolocation or time occurrence. Consequently, original data and weighted metrics
perform as input variables for a decision logic algorithm, which resolves a trust level output.
3.3.1. DCTE definitions
Before going through the details of event-reports evaluation or decision logic techniques, we
will introduce some basic definitions for VANET environment contextualization.
Vehicular Technologies - Deployment and Applications130
• A set of mutually exclusive basic events, denoted as Ω = {α1, α2, α3, · · · , αI} can be
understood as traffic jam, slippery road, detour section, etc. Similarly, composite events
Γ = {γ1,γ2,γ3, · · · ,γI} are the unions or intersections of basic events.
• A set of nodes or vehicles, expressed as V = {v1, v2, v3, · · · , vK} are classified following
a system-specific set of node types, Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, · · · , θN}. For consistency, let define a
function τ : V → Θ to assign and return the type of a scoped vehicle vk.
• Let set a default trustworthiness for a node vk of type θn as a real value, depending on
particular node attributes (e.g. onboard sensor equipment or on road authority member).
Such that, every node type owns a unique and consecutive trustworthiness ranking,
explained by 0 < tθ1 < tθ2 < tθ3 < · · · < tθN < 1.
• Let Λ = {λ1,λ2,λ3, · · · ,λJ} be the set of tasks related to the protocol or system. Thus,
two vehicles (v1, v2) with returned types (τ(v1) = θ1, τ(v2) = θ2) and known default
trustworthiness rankings tθ1 < tθ2 are assumed, though it is still possible that v1 is
regarded as more reliable than v2 in function of task λj ∈ Λ.
• Two input arguments, node type τ(vk) and system task λj conform event-specific
trustworthiness function, distinguished as f : Θ × Λ → [0, 1], which is invoked to
differentiate among nodes of the same type when particular actions are required.
• In terms of security, let introduce security status function s : V → [0, 1], where s(vk) = 0
means the revocation of the node vk and s(vk) = 1 infers the node legitimacy. Any
intermediate value within the interval may be used to characterize scaled security levels.
• At last but not least, let set a dynamic trust metric function, expressed by µl : V×Λ → [0, 1].
The index l points out dynamically changing attributes of nodes. Therefore, for every
attribute, a corresponding metric µl is applied.
3.3.2. DCTE trustworthiness function
The computation of trustworthiness is data-centric or report-oriented. Also, the generated
value from the jth report e
j
k is provided by K distinct mobile nodes vk, which supports on
scattered evidence of event αj. The integration of default trustworthiness, security status,
node type and event-specific trustworthiness functions shapes a general trust function,
denoted by Equation 9
F(e
j
k) = G(s(vk), f (τ(vk),λj), µl(vk,λj)) ∀ F(e
j
k) → [0, 1] (9)
The obtained weights or trust levels within the interval [0, 1] are assessed by a vehicle vk
with respect to every incoming event report from surrounding nodes. Since, the combination
of multiple pieces of evidence is one major concern in DCTE, one unique weight is not a
confident enough outcome. Henceforth, the composite of various weights related to the
same event will conduct to a more robust and reliable decision material. Then, the reports
accompanied by their matched weights are transferred to a decision logicmodule that manages
to find a definitive action to be taken, like message disposal, conditioned forwarding or
full-compliance.
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3.3.3. DCTE decision logic
The decision logic module is strongly related to multisensor data fusion techniques.
Hence, the performed algorithms are rule-based systems, matching simple polling [22],
weighting [23] or statistical procedures. In DCTE context, bayesian inference (BI) and
Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) are discussed as candidate data fusion techniques for decision
logic implementation.
Bayesian Inference
BI is supported by the well-known Bayes’ theorem, where the blended weight of a particular
event αi is defined by the posteriori probability of αi given novel pieces of evidence, e =
{e
j
1, e
j
2, e
j
3, · · · , e
j
K} and it is expressed in terms of apriori probability P[αi], as follows.
P[αi|e] =
P[αi]∏
K
k=1 P[e
j
k|αi]
∑
I
h=1(P[αh]∏
K
k=1 P[e
j
k|αh])
(10)
From Equation 10, it is assumed that event-reports are statistically independent; i.e. the
receiver node is unable to figure out dependencies in reports from different vehicles, which
is rational whereas such an information is not provided within reports. Thus, P[eik|αi]
represents the probability that kth report confirms the event αi, given that αi occurred. By
recalling Equation 9, probability and weights of reports can be equalized as:
P[eik|αi] = F(e
i
k) (11)
In case of detecting, a further report that does not confirm the event αi, given that αi occurred.
It would correspond to a malicious or deceiving node, who is reporting a fake event. So, the
probabilistic complement is denoted by Equation 12.
P[e
j
k|αi] = 1− P[e
i
k|αi] = 1− F(e
i
k) ∀ i 6= j (12)
Dempster-Shafer Theory
One characteristic of DST remains in the tractability of evidence, even though there is lack
of information upon reported events. By the occurrence of two clashing events, measured
uncertainty about one may serve as supporting evidence for other. In comparison with BI, the
probability is replaced by an uncertainty interval, upper bounded by plausibility and lower
bounded by belief. The belief value assigned to an event αi is provided by the K
th report as
the sum of all basic belief assignments mk(aq), where aq collects all basic events that integrate
the event αi. Correspondingly, the plausibility value of an event αi is the sum of all evidence
that does not refute such event. Thus, belief and plausibility are described by Equations 13
and 14, respectively.
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belk(αi) = ∑
q:αq⊂αi
mk(αq) (13)
plsk(αi) = ∑
r:αr∩αi 6=∅
mk(αr) (14)
In regard of this, data fusion can be performed to find the merged weight di respect to event
αi. Indeed, it is the same belief (see Equation 15) expression, such that pls(αi) = 1− bel(αi),
di = bel(αi) = m(αi) =
K⊕
k=1
mk(αi) (15)
where each piece of evidence is blended by making use of Dempster’s rule of combination,
as follows:
m1(αi)
⊕
m2(αi) =
∑q,r:αq∩αr=αi m1(αq)m2(αr)
1−∑q,r:αq∩αr=∅ m1(αq)m2(αr)
(16)
Summing up, Figure 5 depicts system blocks for DCTE framework.
Figure 5. Data-centric Trust Establishment system blocks [21].
3.3.4. DCTE remarks
DCTE model appeals for a simple, system- and protocol-independent framework, composed
basically by two stages: trustworthiness assessment and decision logic. Not only, the trust
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model is mathematically described, but also the entire VANET environment. Therefore,
composite variables translated into vehicles typification, event-reports, system tasks, security
issues and evaluation metrics are integrally controlled by modules of general description.
The intercourse of functions is based on plain operations, whilst outputs remain within
unit-value intervals. Furthermore, the induction of Bayesian inference and Dempster-Shafer
theory as fusion techniques offers a novel view for handling of unions and intersections of
compound events. So far, CoRS and TRIP models performed either polling or weighting
procedures to cope with that issue, but formal results are not sufficiently derived.
As the foregoing fellow models, DCTE delegates the authentication, integrity and
confidentiality issues on exogenous mechanisms; ergo nodes identities and credentials
are supposed to be distributed beforehand. And then, the exposure to security and
privacy-related attacks are current concerns. Moving apart, one of the premises adopted by
DCTE is the ephemeral nature of nodes’ relationships in VANETs, which urges to perform
trustworthiness assessment per event. The actual impact of such a situation on information
sparsity needs further research.
3.4. Distributed Emergent Cooperation through Adaptive Evolution - DECADE
In [24], a game theoretic trust model is proposed, whose aim is encouraging forwarding
cooperation in MANETs. The model, called DECADE, uses a non-cooperative game to
achieve cooperation among rational nodes and isolation of selfish nodes. Furthermore, due
to the distributed nature of the evolution algorithm and the trust evaluation mechanisms,
forwarding cooperation emerges with a low overhead on computational and communication
resources. Although DECADE was designed for general MANET environments, there are
several elements of interest in DECADE that can be considered specifically in VANETs.
So, in this section we briefly describe DECADE principles and then discuss its potential
contributions to VANETs.
3.4.1. The Basic Game Model in DECADE
In transmitting a packet, every node in a path plays a role as a source, intermediate, or
destination node. As an intermediate node, it has to decide whether to forward or discard
a received packet based on a strategy. This strategy will depend on the trust level that the
intermediate node has on the source node, and on the recent behavior of the network as a
whole with its own packets. Each node is supposed to be able to observe the decisions taken
by its neighbors and by all nodes preceding it in a path, so the trust on each observed node
can be computed as the number of forwarding decisions among the last m observations. The
limited memory, m, accounts for the fact that nodes can change their strategies continuously
in order to adapt their behavior to environmental changes, so its value obeys a trade-off: m
has to be large enough to obtain a fair evaluation of the forwarding rate, but m has to be small
enough to ensure that the forwarding rate actually corresponds to the current strategies.
An intermediate node must be very careful to discard a packet because observing nodes
can reduce their trust on it; but it cannot cooperate indiscriminately in order not to become
a "sucker", wasting valuable resources forwarding packets from selfish nodes. Taking this
trade-off into account, the strategy in the forwarding game is encoded by a string of bits that
represents the decision of discarding or cooperating, depending on the trust level that the
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node has in the source node, and on the number of successful transmissions within the last
k own packets.
Each node participates in repeated games, where the decision to cooperate or discard of each
intermediate node obeys to its current strategy. A game consists on the successful or failed
transmission of a packet. Whenever a node is ready to send a packet, it chooses the most
trusted path to the destination, i.e., the one that maximizes the probability that the packet
gets its intended destination (which can be found through a shortest path routing algorithm
under the appropriate distance metric). Then, the source node sends the packet on this path
and each intermediate node decides whether to forward it or to discard it, according to its
own strategies. The game ends either when the packet is delivered to its destination, or
when an intermediate node decides to discard the packet. Once the game has finished, each
intermediate node receives a payoff according to its decision, where forwarding decisions are
paid in direct proportion to the trust level in the source node (rewarding cooperation), while
discarding decisions are paid in inverse proportion (rewarding resource savings).
Given the game theoretic network trust model, it is important to find an optimal strategy for
each node, so that the network as a whole maximizes both the cooperation among rational
nodes and the isolation of selfish nodes. This will be done through a genetic algorithm that
will evolve constantly to track the dynamical changes within the network.
3.4.2. Genetic Algorithm for Strategy Evolution
DECADE uses a distributed genetic algorithm of the cellular type with plasmid migration
heuristics, which not only gives good results in term of the optimality of the converged
solutions, but also exhibits good adaptability to changing conditions. Each node tries to
maximize its payoff by exchanging periodically genetic information with its neighbors in
order to evolve the strategy. As in a classical cellular genetic algorithm, each node receives
the genetic information from all its one-hop neighbors, selects randomly two of them with
a probability of being selected proportional to their fitness and, through the classical one
point cross-over and mutation processes, combines them to construct a new strategy. This
classical cellular mechanism is enhanced with a bacterial plasmid migration concept, where
two heuristics are added. First, each node can accept or reject the new strategy depending
on whether the reported fitness is greater or smaller than its own fitness. Second, each node
can keep a copy of its best previous strategy so that, if during the current plasmid migration
period the new strategy did not increase the fitness, the old strategy can be restored. An
important heuristic in this evolution process is that, since each node keeps a record of its best
strategy so far (plasmid genes instead of chromosomal genes), a node can replace the current
strategy with the stored one, just before any strategy exchange among neighbors takes place.
This heuristic enhances the exploratory capacity of the evolution process.
3.4.3. DECADE remarks
Intended to encourage forwarding cooperation in MANETs, DECADE achieves remarkable
performance results in cooperation among rational nodes, isolation of selfish nodes and
adaptability to changing environments. Furthermore, due to the distributed nature of the
evolution algorithm and the trust evaluation mechanisms, cooperation emerges with a low
overhead on computational and communication resources. However, although forwarding
decisions could become an issue in some infotainment applications of vehicular ad hoc
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networks, the most important current problem in VANETs is in content trust and reputation,
not addressed by DECADE. We just mentioned DECADE because it points out to the
potential of complex systems engineering for trust and reputation systems in VANETs.
Indeed, the whole system develops the cooperation as an emergent phenomenon, which
appears as a consequence of individual decisions, based on local observations. Each node
wants to save its scarce resources by using them rationally, seeking the cooperation of
intermediate nodes to deliver their own packets. As a consequence of the local interactions
among nodes, the global cooperative behavior arises, with the reported performance benefits.
This approach should be explored more extensively in the engineering of VANET systems.
4. Trust and reputation model comparison
In regard of the foregoing trust and reputation passage, including general specifications,
design criteria and structured mechanisms, we conclude the present chapter with an overall
analytical comparison upon the studied models. Firstly, Table 3 gathers the capabilities of
CoRS, TRIP, DCTE and DECADE with respect to the models’ considerations, as a matter
of design, implementation and support. Please note, three possible qualifications (T=Total,
P=Partial, F=Fail) can be given in order to reflect their strengths and downsides.
Criterion CoRS TRIP DCTE DECADE
Low Complexity P P T T
Scalability T T T P
Sparsity T P P P
Security and privacy-related T P P P
Mobility patterns independent P P P P
Trust and reputation decentralization P P T T
Confidence measure F T T P
Event and spatiotemporal specification T T T T
Table 3. Criteria comparison among trust and reputation models.
Closing up, the qualification chart onto low complexity criterion. CoRS and TRIP
protocols incorporates multi-purpose modules to improve the efficiency on trustworthiness
computation, messages convergence, resilience and others. However, the employment
of those metrics moving upward the protocol’s performance, also impacts noxiously the
altogether complexity levels. Likewise, trust and reputation decentralization criterion is partially
fulfilled by CoRS and TRIP protocol, while DCTE and DECADE achieves a ”Total” mark. One
more time, the model conceptualization is intrinsically related to third-party entities, which
are set up to enhance particular aspects in security matters. Indeed, DCTE and DECADE
are also pending to explain how the confidentiality, integrity and authentication issues are
natively handled. In the meantime, the top score is granted, assuming the engagement of
exogenous mechanisms.
A limited performance seems to be equally exhibited by all the examined protocols with
respect to sparsity. Taking CoRS out of this group; the introduction of cryptographic
thresholds boosts the dissemination of information sources, according to the scarcity
conditions on the road. From the bulky generation of shares, the model previously knows
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the actual capabilities of the mobile nodes to interact among them. Then, scenarios with
lack of resources can be foreseen based on some degree of certainty. On the contrary,
the remaining models do not follow a self-sustained strategy to adapt their mechanisms
to selective information retrieval. However, potential potential bases are grounded to achieve
flexible thresholds on trust and reputation assessment. For instance, TRIP and its fuzzy set
of rules might be easily extended to actively manage to this requirement. A quite similar
diagnosis can be emitted about mobility patterns independent criterion, where every protocol
is marked as “Partial”. Notwithstanding, the assurance of a “Total” mark on this concept
would require a massive set of tests, regarding simulated and real scenarios. Until now, the
achievement of common levels of agreement on this matter are very unlikely.
Outstandingly, scalability and event and spatiotemporal specification criteria are satisfactorily
attained by the group of models. The former one can be possibly explained by the accelerated
development of powerful processing platforms, whose physical resources are capable to
adjust to the ongoing demands, neatly. In turn, replaying to what, when and where issues
regarding the events on the road shall be imposed as a compulsory requirement for a
trust and reputation model. Otherwise, practical usages of such protocols could be easily
questioned.
Furthermore, trustworthiness computation metric is definitively one of the most interesting
aspects to be differentiated in each trust and reputation model. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
take a quick tour around the employed assessment techniques. Considering CoRS protocol,
majority voting stands out as the selected method to obtain the trust level TL upon a particular
event. Thus, Equation 17 depicts the value computed by K nodes, where each one contributes
with a +1 reward for a confirmed on road event αi. Likewise, negative or neutral values may
apply in case of fake or deceiving information.
TL =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
f (αi) (17)
In respect to TRIP protocol, weighted polling acts as the calculation method for trustworthiness
modeling. Thereafter, all given recommendations or reports about an event f (αi) is affected
by an scalar weight w, whose value takes into consideration information sources, penalties
and rewards history, VANET complexity, etc. The trust level TL performed by TRIP mode
follows the general rule in Equation 18.
TL =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
w ∗ f (αi) (18)
For DCTE framework, a couple of data fusion techniques are designated for trust and
reputation measurement. In section 3.3.2, we have introduced Bayesian inference as a
statistical approach and Dempster-Shafer theory for evidence evaluation inspired in human
reasoning. For the implicit mathematical description refer to the corresponding section.
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5. Conclusions
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks constitute an emergent and fascinating research field.Many
conceptual architectures, abstract models and heuristic-derived systems are continuously
proposed to cope with the many issues that arise in this area. In this chapter we have made
an effort to describe four of the most remarkable approaches in literature.
CoRS model implements threshold cryptography in a distributed way, achieving low
complexity in security management. In fact, CoRS might be considered one of the most
efficient and effective protocols, although special attention should be given to crowded
networks, since the distribution of repeated shares might lead to system’s collapse. Similarly,
the collator player is a potential faulty point because it is the only party designated to set
time and location of events.
A strength of the TRIP protocol is the use of multiple information sources like direct peers,
referred nodes and central entities. Also the well-defined system of penalties and rewards
makes of TRIP a robust framework for trust and reputation determination. A differentiator
factor of TRIP is its support of trust and reputation scoring system on adaptable probabilistic
functions. However, TRIP has some reliability difficulties to solve.
DCTE strives to deal with trustworthiness assessment, decision logic and environment
description. These aspects are integrated through fusion techniques, generating
representations of trust and reputation scores that achieve both simplicity and efficiency.
Unfortunately, DCTE has major issues in confidentiality, authentication and integrity aspects,
which are assumed to be carried out by third party schemes.
We also introduced DECADE as a newcomer model, given its good performance within
MANETs. The protocol encourages cooperation among rational nodes, isolating selfish nodes
with high adaptability to changing environments. Useful concepts such as the emergence of
a cooperative behavior from simple individual decisions based on local observations, with
very low overhead, points out at the convenience of facing trust and reputation mechanisms
in VANETs through the theory of complex systems. Although DECADE only addresses the
MANET problem of node trust and reputation, its emergent approach could be used in the
most urgent VANET problem of content trust and reputation.
Finally, considering eight criteria (complexity, scalability, sparsity, security, mobility
dependence, decentralization, confidence measure and event specification), we compare the
four selected approaches and notice that none of them satisfy all the criteria. However,
with the exception of independence on mobility, all the different criteria are satisfied but
at least one approach. A good research line would be to exploit the advantages of each
proposal looking for a general framework where to put over solid basis the development of
Distributed Trust and Reputation Mechanisms for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks.
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